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Existing theories of European integration and political economy usually assume that 
economic interdependence is an important precondition for successful regional 
integration. This includes that regional integration among developing countries is 
unlikely to be successful, because their economies are usually more dependent on 
developed countries in the North than on their neighbours in the South. However, this 
article argues that developing countries use regional integration more in order to 
improve their standing vis-à-vis other world regions in the global economic system 
than to govern intraregional interdependence. Thus, the progress of regional 
integration in the South is at least as dependent on the feedback from other regions 
as it is on developments within the own region. This argument will be illustrated at the 
example of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which made 
important steps towards regional integration in the last decade. It centralised its 
institutional structure in 2001 and announced a Free Trade Area in 2008. This 
development can partly be explained by interdependence between the less 
developed countries of the SADC and the relatively well developed Republic of South 
Africa, but it was also favoured by external support from other world regions, 
especially the European Union (EU). Nevertheless, further regional integration 
towards a customs union is disturbed by external influence, because the EU currently 
negotiates different Economic Partnership Agreements with the SADC member 
states, which prevents the harmonisation of tariffs for imports from outside the region. 
 
Keywords: integration theory, international political economy, interregionalism, new 
regionalism, regional integration, SADC, Southern Africa 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor for International Relations, University of Bamberg, Faculty of Social Sciences 
and Economics, Feldkirchenstraße 21, 96052 Bamberg, Germany, Phone: ++49 (0)951 863 2723, E-
Mail: sebastian.krapohl@uni-bamberg.de. 
** Research Fellow at the Graduate School “Markets and Social Systems in Europe”, University of 
Bamberg, Faculty of Social Sciences and Economics, Lichtenhaidestraße 11, 96052 Bamberg, 
Germany, Phone: ++49 (0)951 863 3136, E-Mail: johannes.muntschick@uni-bamberg.de. 
Interregionalism Strengthens Regionalism: 
The Importance of External Support for Regional Integration in Southern Africa 
 




Within the last ten years, the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC)1 has made two important steps toward closer political and economic 
integration: In 2001, the SADC adopted an institutional reform, which strengthened 
the central secretariat in Gaborone, set up a SADC court and included a body for 
defence and security politics into SADC’s structure (Oosthuizen 2006: 51-115, Vogt 
2007: 125-162). And in 2008, twelve SADC member states (excluding Angola and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo) announced the implementation of a free trade 
area, wherein the intra-regional trade of 85% of all goods is no longer affected by 
tariffs.2 Even if these two steps seem to be modest from a European perspective, 
they lead to the fact that the SADC is one of the most advanced regional integration 
schemes among developing countries, and that it is the most successful one on the 
African continent. However, recent events indicate that this path towards closer 
integration may come to an end in near future. The negotiations about different 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the EU pose enormous problems for 
the SADC, because they prevent the adoption of harmonised tariffs and the 
establishment of a SADC customs union (Stevens and Kennan 2006). 
 
These ups and downs of regional integration in Southern Africa are a puzzle for 
scholars of regional integration. Existing theories usually implicitly or explicitly 
assume that successful regional integration depends on liberal democracies and 
advanced economic development. The spill-over concept of neofunctionalism is built 
up on the idea that intraregional trade has dynamic effects on the European 
integration process (Haas 1958). Liberal intergovernmentalism states that economic 
interdependence between member states is the driving force behind European 
integration (Moravcsik 1998). And aside of the specific European debate, political 
economist assume that the demand for regional integration results from the potential 
to exploit comparative cost advantages and economies of scale by intraregional trade 
(Mattli 1999). However, economic interdependence and the potential for intraregional 
                                                 
1 The member states of the SADC are: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
2 SADC (2008): “Final Communiqué of the 28th Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government” 
(http://www.sadc.int/fta/index/browse/page/203). 
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trade are usually lower among developing countries of a region like Southern Africa 
than they are in regions of the North like Europe or Northern America. Developing 
countries usually produce more raw materials than processed goods, and the share 
of subsistence farming is relatively high. As a result, developing countries do not 
constitute significant export markets or investment destinations for each other, but 
they are more dependent on trade with and investment from more developed 
countries. Thus, it is more important for them to reduce barriers of trade and 
investment to the First World than to abolish them among each.  
 
If less developed countries are more dependent on trade with wealthier 
countries in the North than with their neighbours in the South, they may use regional 
integration as a tool to improve their position in the global economic system (Schirm 
2002). This may happen in three ways: Regional integration may improve the 
attractiveness of small developing countries for foreign investors, because these may 
gain access to a larger market by investing within the region (Büthe and Milner 2005, 
Jaumotte 2004). Regional integration may help to raise financial aid from donors – 
especially from other regional integration schemes like the European Union (EU) –, 
because the money may be spent more efficiently within a larger region than within a 
small state (Robson 1993). And finally, regional integration may strengthen the voice 
of the region within multilateral or bi-regional negotiations, if the participating 
countries speak with one vote (Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003).  
 
Consequently, regional integration may bring some advantages for developing 
countries, but these advantages are different from that of regional integration among 
industrialised countries. Whereas regional integration in the North is a self-sustaining 
development which is pushed forward by interests from within the region, regional 
integration in the South is mainly directed outwards and is always dependent on the 
reaction of actors within other world regions. If these reactions are favourable, they 
may strengthen the integration process. But the dependence on other world regions 
includes that the opposite may also happen, i.e. that regional integration comes to a 
halt if feedback from outside is less favourable. Thus, regional integration in the 
South is at least as dependent on interregionalism – the relationship with one or 
more other regions – as it is on developments within the respective own region. 
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In the following, this article analyses the particularities of regional integration in 
the South at the example of the SADC. Thereby, it proceeds in two steps. In its 
theoretical part, the article reviews two logics of regionalism – namely the traditional 
theoretical approaches to regional integration, as well as other rationales for regional 
integration in the South and their likely consequences for the integration process. 
Subsequently, in its empirical part, the article demonstrates that intraregional trade 
and economic interdependence cannot fully explain the relative progress of regional 
integration in Southern Africa, but that external factors – especially support from the 
EU – help significantly to explain the ups and downs of integration in Southern Africa. 
In its conclusion, the article discusses the consequences for regional integration in 
Southern Africa in particular and among developing countries in general. 
 
2. Integration Theory and South-South Integration 
 
When studying regional integration outside of Europe, one notices soon a 
surprising gap in the academic literature. On the one hand, regional integration is 
rather popular in the South (e.g. Andean Community, CARICOM and MERCOSUR in 
Central and Southern America, EAC, ECOWAS and SADC in Africa, ASEAN and 
SAARC in Asia), and there exist more regional integration schemes in the South than 
in the North. On the other hand, the vast majority of theories deals only with regional 
integration in Europe (Rosamond 2000), and just a few approaches from the field of 
international political economy take a broader perspective and compare different 
regional integration schemes (e.g. Mattli 1999). But even these comparative 
approaches mainly concentrate on regional integration in the North, and neglect the 
particularities of regional integration among developing countries. In order to reduce 
this gap between empirics and theory, the following section explores two logics of 
regionalism – namely as a reaction to intraregional interdependence on the one hand 
and to economic dependence from other world regions on the other.  
 
2.1 The First Logic: Regional Integration as a Reaction to Intraregional 
Interdependence 
 
The oldest and most well-known theory of European integration is 
neofunctionalism, which was developed by Haas (1958) in reaction to the set up of 
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the European Coal and Steal Community in 1951. According to this theory, European 
integration is – once it has started – pushed forward by spill-over processes. Such 
spill-over occurs if integration in one area leads to functional pressure to integrate 
another area in order to exploit efficiency gains. For example, the establishment of a 
single market requires the harmonisation of health and safety standards if the 
respective products are traded among national boarders (Krapohl 2009: 17-32). 
Thereby, supranational bodies like the Commission and the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) are the addressees of political demands for more harmonisation, and 
they actively reinforce the integration process (Hooghe 2001, Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz 1997). This development should lead from a free trade area to a customs 
union, a single market, a currency union, and finally to an economic and political 
union (Balassa 1961). However, the preconditions for such a development are 
increasing intraregional trade and economic interdependence. If products were not 
traded on a single market, different product standards would not act as barriers of 
trade. Thus, there would be no political demands for more harmonisation, and the 
supranational institutions could not really reinforce the integration process. Spill-over 
processes would not occur, because the transmission belt which links different 
economic and policy areas is missing. 
 
Not only neofunctionalism, but also its younger opponent liberal 
intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1998) is built up on the assumption of economic 
interdependence. In contrast to neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism is 
much more sceptical in regard to the automatic spill-over processes, and to the 
influence of supranational bodies on the integration process. Liberal 
intergovernmentalism argues that the EU member states still control the integration 
process, and that supranational institutions only help the member states to credibly 
commit themselves to cooperation (Moravcsik 1998: 67-77). However, the reason 
why the EU member states cooperate that closely with each other is economic 
interdependence between them (Moravcsik 1998: 24-50). Due to that 
interdependence, they can no longer regulate their economies independently from 
each other, and they have to cooperate in order to avoid negative externalities of 
individual action. As a result, economic interdependence is as important for liberal 
intergovernmentalism as it is for neofunctionalism. If this interdependence did not 
exist, the EU member states would have no interests to bargain about common 
Interregionalism Strengthens Regionalism: 
The Importance of External Support for Regional Integration in Southern Africa 
 
- 6 - 
economic policies, and to commit themselves to these policies with the help of 
supranational institutions. 
 
The few theoretical approaches which explicitly try to grasp different regional 
integration schemes inside and outside of Europe were mostly developed by political 
economists (Mansfield and Milner 1997, 1999). They all have in common that they 
see regional integration as an answer to globalisation or to successful regional 
integration in other parts of the world (Mattli 1999, Schirm 2002). Thus, regional 
integration is a way to improve the own position within the international system. 
However, political economists also stress the importance of intraregional 
interdependence for regional integration. According to Mattli (1999: 41-67), the 
success of regional integration schemes depends on the fulfilment of a demand and 
supply function. Economic demand for integration results from the fact whether the 
abolishment of trade barriers allows for the exploitation of economies of scale and 
comparative cost advantages by intraregional trade. Thus, the potential for such 
trade is again the driving force for the integration process. And political supply of 
regional integration depends either on the existence of a benevolent hegemon who 
supplies regional integration on its own or on regional institutions which help the 
member states to overcome their cooperation problems. If both economic demand for 
and political supply of regional integration exists, the respective schemes are likely to 
be successful. As a result, Mattli (1999: 68-188) argues that regional integration is 
likely to be more successful in the North (i.e. NAFTA and EU) than in the South (i.e. 
ASEAN and MERCOSUR), because the limited potential for intraregional trade in the 
latter reduces the demand for regional integration. 
 
Whereas these theoretical approaches differ in respect to the relative 
importance and influence of regional institutions – i.e. whether these are the driving 
force behind integration, whether they only indicate necessary credible commitments 
or whether they could be replaced by benevolent hegemons – , they all have in 
common that they are based on the assumption of economic interdependence within 
a regional integration scheme. It is this economic interdependence, which leads to 
demand for regional integration and to the establishment of regional institutions (how 
influential they may ever be vis-à-vis the member states). In the words of historical 
institutionalism (Arthur 1994, Pierson 2000), the developmental path of regional 
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integration is supported by positive feedback from stakeholders within the region, 
because these stakeholders profit from intraregional trade or investment. And this 
feedback is likely to improve further, the more successful regional integration is, and 
the more intraregional trade and investment increase. As a result of this positive 
feedback, it is unlikely that the developmental path of regional integration is left. 
 
2.2 The Second Logic: Regional Integration as a Reaction to Economic Dependence 
on other World Regions 
 
According to the existing theories, regional integration in the South should either 
not exist or should be doomed to failure. Because of low levels of industrialisation, 
less developed countries usually produce mainly agricultural goods or raw materials, 
and their potential to process these goods is rather limited. Thus, the economies of 
the respective countries are highly dependent on the export of unprocessed products 
and on foreign direct investment (FDI) to develop their economies further. The main 
problem is that the neighbours within the respective region usually do not constitute 
relevant markets and do not provide FDI. Because the neighbours themselves are 
less developed, they also try to export raw materials and to attract FDI. The 
respective economies are competitive and can rarely profit from trade or investment 
with each other. Economic interdependence does not so much emerge within a 
region of the South, but rather between regions of the South (exporter of raw 
materials) and regions of the North (exporter of processed goods and source of FDI). 
As a result, economic interdependence cannot be the rationale behind regional 
integration among developing countries. Instead, regional integration in the South 
takes place in order to deal with the dependence on the North, and to improve the 
regions’ standing in the international economic system. 
 
Firstly, regional integration may improve the standing in the international system 
if it makes the respective regions of the South more attractive for FDI from the North 
(Büthe and Milner 2005, Schirm 2002). If several countries of the South integrate, 
war between them becomes less likely, which substantially adds to the region’s 
attractiveness as destination for investment. And if the member states establish a 
free trade area or a customs union, they constitute a larger market than if they follow 
protectionist policies. If investors produce goods in one member state of this region, 
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they automatically get easy access to all the other markets of the free trade area or 
the customs union. Thus, investment becomes more promising, because economies 
of scale are increasing (Jaumotte 2004). Besides, regional integration may lock in 
important policy choices. If some member states of a regional integration scheme 
have a bad reputation among investors, they may rebuild their reputation by 
committing themselves to regional institutions. For this reason, formerly autocratic or 
socialist countries may commit themselves to a regional project of liberalisation and 
de-regulation. All in all, the smaller and the more politically unstable the member 
states of a region are, the more may regional integration help them to attract FDI. 
 
Secondly, a similar rationale also applies for countries of the South which try to 
attract development aid from donors of the North (Robson 1993). Regional 
integration may reduce the risk of conflicts, which in turn reduces the risk that 
investment in developmental aid is lost. Besides, regional integration may increase 
the economy of scale of such aid, because larger transnational development projects 
can be supported. And further, regional institutions may also lock in certain policy 
choices of developing countries, what depicts them more attractive to donors. Aside 
of these rationales – which look similar to that for the attraction of FDI –, regions in 
the North may also support regional integration in the South for their very own 
reason. Especially the EU openly encourages regional integration elsewhere in order 
to export its own developmental model (De Lombaerde et al. 2008, Doctor 2007, 
Lenz 2008). Thereby, it tries to strengthen the importance of regions in world politics 
in general, and aims to get significant influence on the respective integration 
schemes in particular. To sum up, regional integration in the South may help to 
increase development aid especially when the developing states are small and 
potentially unstable, and when the donors have corresponding policy preferences 
towards regional integration. 
 
Finally, regional integration may improve the bargaining position of small 
developing countries vis-à-vis other countries or world regions (Mansfield and 
Reinhardt 2003). As long as small developing states act on their own within 
international negotiations, they are likely to be relatively unimportant for more 
powerful countries of the North, and thus, their voice is unlikely to be heard. 
However, if the respective countries of a region integrate and speak with one voice in 
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international negotiations, any disregard will be more difficult and their importance 
and influence is likely to increase. Thus, they may gain much better chances to 
negotiate preferential trade agreements with other regions like the EU. This effect is 
the more important, the smaller the respective countries are, and the better they are 
able to find a common bargaining position. 
 
As a result, there is a range of arguments why less developed countries of the 
South may opt for regional integration, but the rationale behind these arguments is 
fundamentally different from that of regional integration in the North (Robson 1993). 
Whereas regional integration in the North aims to deal with economic independence 
within the region, regional integration in the South mainly aims to deal with economic 
interdependence with – or dependence on – other world regions. This also has an 
effect on the positive feedback on regional institutions and on the resulting stability of 
the developmental path. Regional integration schemes in the North receive positive 
feedback from within the region. If they are successful with their task of liberalising 
trade and investment, economic interdependence increases and regional integration 
is further supported by stakeholders who profit from this interdependence. In 
contrast, regional integration schemes in the South need to seek positive feedback 
from outside the region. If they are successful, FDI increases, development aid grows 
and international negotiations end with better results. However, all these positive 
feedbacks are not dependent on the respective region alone, but they are also 
heavily influenced by external factors. The supply of FDI depends not only on the 
attractiveness of a region, but also on the global economic climate. The amount of 
development aid does also not only depend on regional factors, but also on 
economic and political factors within the donor countries. And the outcome of 
international negotiations is also dependent on the strategic behaviour of other 
negotiators. As a result, at least in the short-run, the success of regional integration 
schemes in the South remains to be dependent on the behaviour of external actors.  
 
2.3 Consequences for Regional Integration in the South 
 
Because of the generally low level of development in regions of the South, it is 
likely that the second logic of regional integration prevails over the first one – which 
leads to the assumption that regional integration in the South remains to be 
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dependent on external support from other world regions. As long as the latter support 
integration, it is likely that the respective developmental path will be followed. But 
also the reverse is true, and regional integration may come to a halt if feedback from 
outside the region is contradictory, missing or negative. The consequence is that 
regional integration in the South is a much less stable developmental path than in the 
North, because the positive feedback is dependent on many factors which are 
outside of the scope of the integration project. 
 
A self-sustaining integration process which follows the first logic can only 
emerge to some limited degree if at least one country of the region is developed 
enough to profit from trade with other states of the region and to be a significant 
source of FDI – or even development aid – within the region. In this case, economic 
interdependence emerges, because the developed state is dependent on the 
markets of its neighbours, whereas the neighbours themselves are dependent on FDI 
or development assistance from the relatively more developed state. This economic 
interdependence may reinforce the integration process, because it leads to positive 
feedback from stakeholders who profit from it. However, as long as only one member 
state of a regional integration scheme in the South is fairly developed, economic 
interdependence is likely to remain significantly weaker than within regional 
integration schemes of the North. 
  
Only if FDI and developmental aid helped to develop the respective region, 
intraregional trade and economic interdependence could significantly increase in the 
long run and positive feedback from within the region could finally support the 
regional integration scheme. Thus, the second logic of regionalism may be step-y-
step replaced by the first one if the strategy of regional integration is successful. The 
crux is that the respective regions have to integrate first before economic 
interdependence will follow at a later stage. This is only likely to be successful if 
integration is supported from outside of the respective region. 
 
3. Regional Integration in Southern Africa 
 
From all the different regional integration schemes on the African continent 
(inter alia the Economic Community of West African States, the East African 
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Community, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and SADC), the 
SADC is probably one of the most constant, realistic and promising regional 
integration projects that already has reached a considerable degree of integration 
and shows certain dynamics. At the beginning of the new millennium, it has reformed 
and centralised its institutional structure, and it has just recently established a FTA. A 
customs union is envisaged for 2010, but overlapping regional integration schemes in 
the region and several EPA negotiations with the EU pose problems in this respect. 
Although regional integration within Southern Africa seems to be low in European 
standards, the recent integration steps make SADC to one of the most successful 
regional integration schemes among developing countries. The following sections will 
demonstrate that this relatively successful integration cannot be fully explained by 
economic interdependence within the region, but that it is rather dependent on the 
support of actors from other world regions. 
 
3.1 The First Logic: Economic Interdependence within Southern Africa 
 
Generally, Southern Africa is a region with low economic interdependencies 
between its constituent countries as most of them are classified as less or least 
developed with poor economic performance. To a general lack of industrial capacity 
comes the existence of undiversified, subsistence economies where the few goods 
suitable for export – as precious minerals, metals, oil and other raw materials – 
predominantly originate from the primary sector. The structure of domestic markets 
and the spectrum of tradable goods are very similar within the region and thus the 
chance to exploit complementarities rather little. This becomes visible by the fact that 
intra-regional trade in Southern Africa is with circa 12 %3 of total trade at a very low 
level because countries are strongly export-orientated to global markets in overseas 
as it has been since colonial times (ECA 2007: 143-157). Economic interdependence 
within Southern Africa does only exist with regard to the Republic of South Africa 
(RSA), which is the economic giant of the region and a fairly industrialised and 
developed nation from a global perspective. South Africa accounts for about 70 % of 
SADC’s GDP and its share of SADC’s total exports and imports is not much smaller 
with 64 % respectively 48 % (2006). However, South Africa’s exports to and imports 
                                                 
3 The figures regarding the intra-regional trade in SADC differ in the literature and rank between 8 and 
25 % (Adelmann 2003: 52; Lee, 2003: 102). The given number results from an own calculation from 
the SADC Trade Database (http://www.sadctrade.org/tradedata). 
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from SADC only account for about 10 % respectively 3.5 % of its total trade volumes 
(2006).4 This fact highlights again the low intra-regional interdependence of Southern 
Africa and its dependence on overseas markets. 
 
Within the region, South Africa’s economy is the only one which is quite 
diversified. The Republic’s exports to SADC and its members consist to a major part 
of value-added manufactured goods, while imports are composed largely of lower-
value primary commodities (Cureau 2004: 103-105). The trade balance between the 
RSA and the rest of SADC is throughout advantageous for the first for decades. In 
2006 its trade surplus totalled about three billion US-$.5 With the opening of markets 
and the liberalisation of trade within SADC, South Africa’s export-orientated 
manufacturing industry could benefit by exploiting economies of scale and flooding 
the much lesser developed neighbouring countries – particularly in the North of 
SADC – with its own manufactured products that often cannot compete on global 
markets. Hence, one example of a classic asymmetric ’North-South’ trading-pattern 
seems to exist within the broader framework of ‘South-South’ cooperation in 
Southern Africa. 
 
However, whereas South Africa’s economic development interdependence may 
explain its interest to pursue regional market integration, the less does it clarify why 
weaker and less developed states in Southern Africa should be interested to become 
members of a regional  integration project as economic interdependencies between 
them are negligible. One reason for this might be that the less developed SADC 
members try to attract South African FDI and the benefiting effects on socioeconomic 
development attributed to it. Since the end of apartheid, the RSA provides a 
considerable share of FDI to several smaller countries in the region and was the top 
foreign investor in seven from 14 SADC countries between 1994 and 2003. 
(Grobbelaar 2004: 93-95). However, besides the relatively large impact, which South 
African FDI has for some of SADC’s poorer member states, Africa in general 
receives only a marginal share of the Republic’s total outward FDI flows, whereas by 
far the most money is invested in other world regions (Goldstein 2004: 51-52, Odén 
                                                 
4 Figures regarding the year 2006 retrieved from the International Trade Centre: ‘Trade Map’ 
(http://www.trademap.org). 
5 Figure according to Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS) SADC Trade Database 
(http://data.sadctrade.org/st). 
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2001: 90). Here again, economic interdependence within the region is much less 
importance than economic relationships to other world regions. 
 
The same is true with regard to the attraction of developmental assistance. 
Within the SADC, South Africa itself starts to emerge as a regional donor and 
recently established the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund as 
an instrument to deliver developmental assistance to relevant institutions and 
countries in the region (Tjønneland 2008: 19). The strong dependence of the BLNS6 
states on membership in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and on South 
Africa’s benevolence highlights this asymmetric interdependence within the region. 
The Common Revenue Pool and its recently modified distributional formula to the 
advantage of the BLNS countries are side-payments from South Africa to SACU’s 
less developed members (Bach 2005: 143-147, McCarthy 1999). Similar to SACU, 
the SADC plans to implement a Regional Development Fund as an institution to 
compensate smaller members’ impending tax losses resulting from removed trade-
barriers and lower customs revenues in the SADC FTA (Draper and Khumalo 2005: 
23-24, Landsberg and Monyae 2006: 141). Nevertheless, compared to 
developmental assistance from other world regions, this limited aid from the RSA is 
only a very small fraction. Generally, the SADC member states are much more 
dependent on developmental aid from other world regions than on side payments 
within the region. 
 
In sum, classical approaches of regional integration face difficulties when 
explaining the relative success of regional integration in Southern Africa. 
Intraregional trade and economic interdependence within the region is very low, and 
the SADC member states are more dependent on good economic relationships with 
more developed regions in the North than with their less developed neighbours within 
the own region. But why did the SADC establish an FTA if the potential for trade is 
low? And why were the regional institutions of the SADC strengthened if they do not 
need to govern intra-regional interdependence? Thus, other factors than the 
traditional ones have to be taken into account in order to explain regional integration 
in Southern Africa. 
 
                                                 
6 The BLNS states are Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. 
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3.2 The Second Logic: Positive Feedback from Outside 
 
Regional cooperation and integration schemes in Southern Africa have a rather 
long tradition of asymmetric, dependent relationship with regions and regional actors 
of the Northern hemisphere. The Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference, founded in 1980, was the highly decentralised predecessor of SADC 
and mainly aimed to fight the economic and infrastructural dependence on the South 
African apartheid regime. In doing this, SADCC was very outward orientated as the 
organisation depended strongly on official development assistances and donors’ 
funds. This strategy was very successful as SADCC and its member states received 
large amounts of money for their purposes, with about 90 % of it originating from 
countries or institutions of the Western world (Oosthuizen 2006: 64-69, Vogt 2007: 
57-84). This tradition of strong external donors’ support towards SADCC continues 
today with respect to its organisational successor. SADC can be seen as a magnet 
for various kinds of developmental aid where membership is the key to access or 
participate in these funds (Oosthuizen 2006: 324). This positive effect is additionally 
underpinned by the fact that developmental policies of major international, regional – 
particularly the EU – and national actors have changed and nowadays focus explicitly 
on strengthening and supporting regional integration projects and their institutional 
frameworks (Kennes 1999: 38, Tjønneland 2008). Between 1992 and 2002, about 80 
% of the costs of total internal SADC projects were financed by external donors (Lee 
2003: 53, Vogt 2007: 101-102). 
 
As an example, the European Union as an institution provides at present time 
about € 104 million for a variety of ongoing SADC projects directly to the 
organisation. These projects focus inter alia on the promotion of investment and 
intra-regional trade, institutional capacity building, improvement of infrastructure and 
supporting EPA negotiations. Particularly important for SADC as an organisation is 
the financial support for the SADC Secretariat’s and Directorates’ technical capacity 
where the EU7 is again the major external donor (Tjønneland 2008: 15, 39-45). For 
the time period 2008-2013 the EU intends to allocate another € 135 million under the 
                                                 
7 The European Commission’s Delegation to Botswana gives a detailed overview of ongoing EU-
SADC projects (http://www.delbwa.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_and_sadc/examples.htm). 
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10th European Development Fund for development cooperation with SADC (Köseler 
2007: 24). 
 
 Comparable to the flows of developmental assistance, a second asymmetry 
between Southern Africa and the developed regions in the North exists with respect 
to the direction of FDI flows. While South Africa plays a significant role in providing 
FDI for some less developed neighbouring countries, the country itself is heavily 
dependent on the influx of FDI from overseas if sustainable and industrial 
development shall be achieved. The country’s share of total FDI inflows to the rest of 
SADC has been about 72 % in 2007 and shows – since 1998 together with Angola – 
the highest, although sometimes oscillating, figures in the years before (Dahl 2002: 
74, Hartzenberg and Kalenga 2007: 135, UNCTAD 2008: 254). With regard to the 
RSA the EU is by far the major source of FDI to the country with a share of e.g. 65.5 
% of total FDI between 2003 and 2004. Generally, although figures are often very 
volatile with respect to particular years, the SADC region experienced a considerable 
increase in total FDI inflows from 1990 onwards up until now. In 1995, the region 
received for the first time inflows significantly higher than 1 billion US-$ and by 1997 
the 5 billion US-$ barrier was surpassed regularly (Dahl 2002: 74, Hartzenberg and 
Kalenga 2007: 135, Lee 2003: 170). In 2007, the total inflow of FDI to SADC member 
states amounted about 9.7 billion US-$ which is again is a considerable increase 
compared to about 2.1 billion US-$ in 2006 and 7.2 billion US-$ in 2005 (UNCTAD 
2008: 41-42, 254). 
 
To sum up, regional integration in Southern Africa clearly follows the second 
logic of regionalism. The region is much more dependent on the economic 
relationships to more developed regions within the North than on the successful 
governance of intra-regional interdependence. Thus, integration is mainly used to 
improve the regions standing vis-à-vis its donors and foreign investors. As long as 
the feedback from these external effects is positive – e.g. as long as developmental 
assistance and FDI are increasing like during the last decade – the developmental 
path is strengthened and regional integration is likely to proceed.  
 
3.3 Negative Feedback from Outside? The Case of the EPAs 
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 If regional integration in Southern Africa is mainly dependent on external 
support from outside, the crucial question is what happens if this external feedback is 
less positive for regional integration. In this case, one would expect problems for the 
integration process, because most member states would give first priority to the 
negotiations with more developed regions in the North, which provide developmental 
aid and foreign direct investment. Only if single member states were more dependent 
on aid or FDI from a more developed country like South Africa, they would 
nevertheless choose to integrate in order not to endanger this economic relationship.  
 
At present time, the EU claims to foster regional integration in the SADC region 
through its pending EPAs which implicate mutual – but asymmetric – trade 
liberalisation and include policies and measurements of regional capacity building 
and particularly developmental assistance and aid. Under the new Cotonou 
Agreement, the EPAs are WTO-compatible and aim to create lager, economically 
integrated regional markets as stepping stones for liberalised world trade. Thus, they 
could be regarded as instruments to foster regional integration in Southern Africa 
with Europe being the external source for positive feedback (Oosthuizen 2006: 156-
158). According to the EU8, the EPAs will support the regional integration process, 
and they will be built up in a way to reflect the socioeconomic conditions in the SADC 
member states.  
 
However, in practice the situation is different. Due to overlapping integration 
schemes in the region and the obviously indifferent standing of the EU, the EPAs 
have initiated a serious split in the region and across regional integration schemes. 
Although the majority of SADC members belong to the SADC EPA9 grouping, some 
member states chose for various reasons to be part of the Eastern and Southern 
African (ESA) EPA10 group that was initiated by the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa. Tanzania and the DRC are neither part of these two groupings.11 
Furthermore, in 1998 South Africa already bilaterally adopted a reciprocal free trade 
                                                 
8 European Commission (2005): “Trade for Development EU – SADC. Economic Partnership 
Agreement” (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/february/tradoc_127350.pdf). 
9 SADC member states that belong to the SADC EPA grouping are Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia, Swaziland (signed) and Angola and South Africa (not signing).  
10 SADC member states that belong to the ESA EÜA grouping are Madagascar, Mauritius, Zimbabwe 
(signed) and Malawi and Zambia (not signing).  
11 Worldbank (2008): “Africa. Economic Partnership Agreements between Africa and the European 
Union: What to do now?”, Report 45945 APR (http://www.dgroups.org/groups/CoOL/docs/EPAs-
Africa-What_to_do_Now-World_Bank_1008.pdf?ois=no). 
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agreement – the Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) – with the 
EU. This agreement inevitably includes the BLNS states – which are more dependent 
on South Africa than other states of the region – as members of SACU although they 
were not explicitly involved in the negotiation process and despite the fact that they 
are likely to face considerable negative consequences to their national budgets 
(Oosthuizen 2006: 76, Mushiri 2008: 120, 125, van der Staak 2007: 4-5). Regarding 
the EPA negotiations, the SADC region thus looks even more like a mixture of 
spaghetti and cannelloni (Draper, Halleson and Alves 2007) than a homogenous 
block.   
 
With the adoption of the TDCA, the EU undermined the evolving regional 
integration process for the first time as it provided separate trade conditions to South 
Africa and de facto SACU than to the rest of SADC. This will lead to intraregional 
interferences and complicate the situation if the SADC EPA should fully enter into 
force. An impracticable overlapping between the South Africa-SACU TDCA and the 
SADC EPA could become true if no harmonisation between them took place (Köseler 
2007: 30-31, Oosthuizen 2006: 76). The crux of the EPAs is that their implication of a 
common free trade agreement between the EU and the regional grouping demands 
an internal FTA between the latter countries in order to be operational. This will 
additionally lead, as it can already be observed today, to the creation of several FTAs 
in the region with some SADC members being part of more than a single one.  
 
Additionally, the EPAs and their alleged impact strongly push for fast-track 
implementation of the relevant trade protocols in the regional groupings and for the 
creation of respective customs unions. It is only that way, that the partner countries in 
Southern Africa could prepare their socio-economic and institutional infrastructure for 
the trade liberalisation process and better cushion alleged negative impacts related 
to the implementation of the EPAs. The possible negative effects of such short-
sightedly established institutions are not taken into account yet (Köseler 2007: 29-30, 
Mushiri 2008: 118, 124-127, Shilimela 2008: 19-23). However, exactly these negative 
implicit intentions of the EPAs could be responsible for a final split in SADC if both, 
the SADC and the ESA EPA, would result in an undeliberate and non-harmonised 
creation of customs unions. In that case, some present day SADC members would 
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have to do a final decision to what regional integration project they would like to 
belong to in the end.  
 
To conclude, despite the EU’s statements regarding the support of regional 
integration in developing countries in general and Southern Africa in particular, in 
practice the TDCA and the EPAs can be judged as negative feedback to the regional 
integration process of SADC as they endanger the ‘territorial integrity’ of the 
integration project. At present time, the whole situation is rather unclear and not yet 
finally settled as negotiations between the EU and the various EPA groupings in 
Southern Africa still continue and no customs union beside SACU has been 
operational yet. Due to time pressures, only an interim-EPA has been adopted so far. 
Perhaps the EPAs might speed-up the formation of customs unions in Southern 
Africa, but probably not within the borders of the regional integration schemes as we 
know them today. Keeping in mind the limited financial resources and capacity in 
SADC countries, the territorial integrity of the SADC becomes even more unlikely if 
the EU does not harmonise its inconsistent policies towards the region through 




Despite the fact that existing literature on regional integration stresses the 
importance of intra-regional trade and economic interdependence for the success of 
regional integration schemes, there exists at least a second logic of regionalism, 
which has fundamental different consequences for the integration process than the 
first one. According to the first logic, regional integration is an answer to govern 
interdependence within the respective regions. If this is successful, the 
developmental path of regional integration receives positive feedback from 
concerned stakeholders within the region. In contrast, according to the second logic, 
regional integration is a way to deal with dependence on other world regions and to 
improve one’s own standing within the global economic system. The main difference 
to the first logic is that positive feedback for regional integration according to the 
second logic is much less direct and is dependent on many more factors, which are 
outside the scope of the integration scheme. The attraction of FDI and development 
aid, as well as the improvement of the own bargaining position is not only dependent 
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on successful integration, but also on the reaction of external actors. If this reaction is 
positive, it is likely that the developmental path of regional integration is 
strengthened. However, if the feedback from outside is negative or ambivalent, 
regional integration may face problems. 
 
The problem for regional integration in the South is that it is much more based 
on the second logic than regional integration in the North. Members of regional 
integration schemes in the South are usually less developed and their economies are 
heavily dependent on the export of raw materials and agricultural products. Thus, the 
respective economies do not constitute markets or investment goals for each other. 
Intra-regional trade and economic interdependence remain low. In contrast, regions 
of the South are much more dependent on the attraction of developmental aid or FDI 
from other regions, especially from those in the more developed North. Although 
regional integration may help them in this respect, the result is much more uncertain 
than in the case of regional integration in the North. Consequently, regional 
integration in the South is much more dependent on positive feedback from outside. 
Integration according to the first logic may only occur in the South if at least one 
member state is developed enough to trade and invest within the region, or if regional 
integration is that successful that economic development and this more economic 
interdependence are the results. 
 
The case of Southern Africa supports this hypothesis in respect to regional 
integration in the South. Limited intra-regional trade and economic interdependence 
exist only in respect to the fairly developed RSA, but remains to be low among the 
other SADC member states. In sum, the SADC member states are much more 
dependent on the economic relationships to more developed regions of the North 
than on that to their neighbours. As a result, regional integration in Southern Africa 
proceeds as long as it is supported from outside. During the last decade, both 
developmental aid and FDI were increasing within the region, and consequently, the 
integration process proceeded. This development may now come to an end, because 
feedback from outside becomes much more ambivalent or even negative. Whereas 
the EU officially states that it aims to support regional integration among developing 
countries in general and in Southern Africa in particular, the EPA negotiations are 
likely to have negative effects. Instead of negotiating with the SADC directly, the EU 
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negotiates with at least three different groups of Southern African States. If this 
should lead to different EPAs with different trade conditions, the establishment of a 
SADC-wide customs union would be fundamentally disturbed, because the SADC 
members could not establish a common external tariff. A possible result is that the 
SADC splits and that a smaller core of countries which are especially dependent on 
the RSA (a ‘SACU plus’) proceeds with integration, whereas the others are left 
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